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When Logic Gives Out. Frege on Basic Logical Laws
Walter B. Pedriali
Introduction
How are basic logical laws (BLL) given to us? Or equivalently: how
can deduction be justified? The question, however we pose it, is fa-
miliarly thorny. It is also absolutely central to the success of Frege’s
logicist project. Here’s why. According to Frege, the Urproblem of
arithmetic is the question of how we apprehend logical objects.1 It
follows that the success of the logicist enterprise depends on the pro-
vision of a satisfactory answer to the question of how we can justi-
fiedly hold certain basic truths to be logical, for it is only through
those laws that we can come to grasp those objects by purely logical
means.2
And yet, for all its importance, the question of BLL-justification is
one that Frege never fully addressed. At different times in his career,
he considered three seemingly distinct ways of answering it, but he
stopped short of endorsing or even of precisely articulating any of
them.
The three suggestions are, very roughly, that the logical laws are
constitutive of thought and hence that they are given to us through
the activity of thinking and judging; that their authority over us flows
from their being self-evident (we cognise them through some sort
of rational insight, and their self-evidence entails that they are self-
justifying as well); finally, that BLL are apprehended via grasp of
their constituent senses—they are true-in-virtue-of-content, and it is
sense-understanding (via grasp of compositionally determined struc-
ture) that grounds their apprehension while also providing appropri-
1See the very last paragraph of Grundgesetze.
2Frege (1980: 121, 141, 191 fn. 69).
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ate justification for our holding them to be logically true.3
The apparent heterogeneity of these strategies could either lead us
to construe them as complementary, in that we could think of them
as purporting to illuminate different aspects of the same underlying
epistemic problem, or it could instead suggest that they are mutually
exclusive, and thus indicative of a certain wavering over this issue on
Frege’s part as he realised that each of those answers is in prima facie
tension with some crucial aspects of his conception of logic.
At any rate, what all these answers have in common is a startling
concession that at the limit of enquiry, at the point wherewe ask about
the most fundamental features of the structure of thought, logic has
got to give out.4 Logic, Frege tells us, regulates thought-transitions,
but there is no transition to BLL over which logic could legislate.
Some other form of rational constraint must be in place there. But
of what kind?
The puzzle is familiar from other areas of enquiry.5 In the philoso-
phy of logic, though, it takes on a specific urgency, particularly so in
Frege’s case, given his dual commitments to the universality of logic
(i.e. to logic being the science of widest generality) and to a firm re-
jection of any form of psychologism (i.e. to the banishing of any view
that would make logic hostage to the contingent cognitive processes
of thinkers).
On the face of it, those commitments seem to leave little space for an
answer to our question that would jointly satisfy them. Any sugges-
tion we might make regarding the rational constraints presiding over
the apprehension of BLL will clash, or so it appears, with (at least)
one of those two key components of his conception of logic (if logic
cannot regulate transitions to BLL, then the universality thesis seems
threatened; if e.g. we try to invoke constitutivity principles regulative
of all thinking to explain those transitions, we risk running afoul of
the anti-psychologist constraint).
My purpose in this chapter is to rehearse these three broad lines
of response to our Urfrage and assess whether they build up to a co-
herent picture of the epistemology of BLL, in particular a picture that
3GL (§§14, 26); GG (xvi-xvii); GL (§§2, 90), GG (viii, 253); and (1923a: 405; 1980: 183; 1914a:
247) respectively. I shall use three abbreviations, namely, ‘BG’ for Begriffschrift, ‘GL’ forGrundlagen
and ‘GG’ for Grundgesetze.
4Frege (1879/1891: 3, 6; 1906a: 175).
5For just one example, see O’Neill (2000: 11).
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would sit well with the rest of Frege’s views.6
The structure of the chapter is as follows. I first outline an argument
for the essential basicness of the fundamental laws of logic. In the fol-
lowing three sections I thenmove on to consider the three approaches
I have just introduced, as well as a fourth one (in §5), proposed by
Burge (1998) and Reck (2007), which I dub “pragmatic foundation-
alism” and that proposes to somehow unite them all in one cohesive
picture. In the last section, I put forward a modified version of this
last proposal which I think ismore in keepingwith Frege’s own frame-
work.
1.The Architectural Argument
First, then, let me very briefly review what I shall call the architectural
argument for the obtaining of basic logical knowledge. The major
premise in the argument is that if there is to be any knowledge at
all, there have to be, on pain of regress, some truths which are not
derived from other truths (the game of asking for reasons cannot go
on ad infinitum, we are told).7 On the plausible assumption that we
do have knowledge of logical facts (e.g. entailments and so forth), the
argument concludes that we have (and must be credited as having)
knowledge of basic (i.e. underived) logical truths.
Those truths, given the argument, are exempted from normal stan-
dards of justification. Happily, the architecturally-induced exemp-
tion is wholly appropriate since BLL are epistemically unimprovable
anyway—no inferentially derived justification could strengthen their
epistemic standing. If so, we might just as well conclude, as Frege
6Opinion is divided as to whether Frege has said enough for us to reconstruct his views on
the matter with sufficient textual authority on our side. Burge (1998: 322) and Heck (2012: 34)
think he has. Ricketts (1986: 74, 81; 1996: 124; 1997: 174), Weiner (1986: 22), Goldfarb (2001: 30-
1) disagree. For general doubts concerning the point of providing BLL-justification see Dummett
(1991c: 204), Heck (2012: 28), Stanley (1996: 122-3), Blanchette (2012: 153) and Sullivan (2005:
101). Haack (1976) and Greimann (2014: 276) declare BLL-justification to be impossible. Nagel
(1997: 62) thinks that it is impossible coherently to challenge BLL. Sullivan (2011: 160) and Enoch
(2011: 220) are unconvinced by this kind of response. Finally, van Heijenoort (1967: 326), Ricketts
(1985) and Weiner (1990, 2001, 2002) have suggested elucidation is the best the Fregean can do in
this area.
7See e.g. Locke (1689/1975: IV.vii.§19), Frege (1879/1891: 3; GL: §3, fn. 1; 1914a: 204; GG:
vi); Russell (1903/1996: §17), Dummett (1991c: 245-6), Boghossian (2001: 239ff.; 2003: 271), Hale
(2002: 279), Peacocke (2004: 72; 2008: 156-8), BonJour and Sosa (2003: §1.2) and Russell (2008:
197).
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himself did, that BLL neither need nor admit of external epistemic
support. In addition to their privileged architectural role, then, BLL
are also declared to be self-justifying because epistemically speaking
they are internally grounded.
For our purposes, I’ll grant that the argument carries weight. We’ll
shortly be considering how the self-justifying claim (a claim that is
somewhat independent of the architectural argument) could bemade
more precise. Our first task, however, is to find out how we can iden-
tify the class of BLL.
1.1.The Marks of the Logical
What are the distinguishing features of BLL?We can attribute to Frege
a cluster theory of BLL gathering together those marks of the logical
that are singly necessary and jointly sufficient for something to count
as a BLL.
On Frege’s view, then, BLL are
maximally general they apply to all areas of scientific inquiry—any
area where the question of truth arises;8
non-proof-apt since in the case of BLL proof is neither available nor
required: it is a categorymistake to think they could be proved;9
not analytic for they are analytically basic;10
self-evident in the three senses of being i) self-standing in the natural
order of truths, ii) self-justifying in epistemic space, and iii) epis-
temically pellucid, i.e. their unconditional truth is immediately
8Frege (1897b: 128; 1885a: 112; 1906c: 338). See Burge (2000: 369), Goldfarb (2010: §1),
Blanchette (2012: ch. 6) and Heck (2012: 35-6) for discussion.
9GL (§3). In a particular (epistemic-driven) sense of ‘proof ’ of course. We can always prove
BLL. But this is a system-relative notion of proof. The notion of unprovability operative in Frege
is instead an absolute one, and one to do solely with epistemic standing (no formal derivation of
BLL in a system of proof could improve that standing). For just one example of the move from
unprovability to logical basicness, see Frege (1891: 142). For the converse thesis, see e.g. GG (II,
§60).
10That BLL are not Frege-analytic may strike one as surprising. But Frege-analyticity is proof-
involving (see GL §3). It follows that BLL cannot be analytic, for if they were they would then be
provable, and thus contradict the non-proof-aptness constraint. See Dummett (1991b: 24), Burge
(1998: 322; 2003) and Sullivan (2004: fn. 85) for discussion. Contra Benacerraf (1981: 45), then,
Frege’s analytic/synthetic distinction is not exhaustive.
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obvious to reflection for a thinker who fully grasps them;11
all-encompassing in the sense of being proof-theoretically complete,
that is, they contain within themselves, “as if in a kernel”, the en-
tire reasoning edifice (they surveyably contain the class of their
syntactic consequences);12
demonstrably fruitful their all-encompassing nature must be veri-
fied andmademanifest in the actual exercise of inferencewithin
a range of derivational systems.13
In the next three sections I focus in turn on the three main lines
of response to our main question. As we shall see, the marks of the
logical that I have just outlined will play a crucial part in the attempt
to sharpen up each of these replies.
First, though, let me take a very brief detour on the question of
unprovability.
1.2. BLL and the Absence of Proof
For Frege, then, BLL are essentially non-proof apt. By saying that
structural unprovability is one of the constitutive marks of BLL, how-
ever, we haven’t yet shown that the in-principle unavailability of proof
for the basis won’t infect the entire construction. From the preface
to Begriffsschrift onwards, Frege steadfastly held that in mathematics
justification depends on proof. But if BLL admit of no proof, how can
unjustified (and indeed unjustifiable) justifiers legitimately be said to
provide justification for the whole of mathematics? To parry this
worry, we need to show that even without proof on their side BLL
can still enjoy some kind of rational justification, indeed, enough jus-
tification to get the justification game going. This is in fact the task
that will occupy us for the rest of this essay.
As we saw earlier, according to Frege when it comes to BLL-
justification logic has to give out. Now, this could either be because
11GL (§17), Frege (1899-1906: 168; 1923a: 405.)
12BG (§13), GL (§§17, 88), GG (II, 149), Frege (1885a: 113; 1914a: 204-5).
13This is, as it were, the converse thesis of logicism: given that arithmetic is reducible to logic,
BLL must also provably contain exactly the amount of mathematics that we want to prove. If they
do, then our initial choice is confirmed as correct. I have not included the mark of surveyability
(Übersichtlichkeit, seeGL §5), that is, unimpeded accessibility to Reason, which I think of as a feature
of self-evidence.
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there can be no such thing as a thought-transition to BLL or because
the transition, although still subject to some sort of normative con-
straint, is not one that logic can regiment (precisely because of the
non-proof-aptness of BLL). Call these transitions, of either kind,BLL-
entry points. They are, in effect, the entry points of rationality.14
Under the first option, cognitive access to BLL would be radically
immediate, perhaps in a manner analogous to perception—that BLL
are true is something that we can see.15 But this won’t do because
Frege is notoriously insistent that mathematics be grounded in a
purely logical source of cognition, a source that, unlike perception,
is capable of thoroughly intersubjective assessment.16 If a form of
insight is called for, it had then better be some form of rational in-
sight or else it would be rationally blind. In the next section, we’ll be
rehearsing a conception of BLL-entry points along these lines
Under the second option, access to BLL is not immediate, but the
transition to them is not inferentially mediated either. It still is nor-
matively constrained, though. We’ll explore this option in §3.
There is also a variant of the first option, one that rejects as inco-
herent the very idea that there could be such a thing as an entry point
to rationality (or equivalently, that those points could coherently be
said to be accessible). We’ll deal with this option in §4.
Before we move on, let me quickly summarise the constraints we
are working under. Firstly, a Fregean account of BLL-justification
must respect the universality thesis without violating the anti-
psychologism requirement. Secondly, the account needs to show how
BLL can justifiedly be grasped either in virtue of sui generis thought-
transitions to them or in virtue of some sui generis features of their
content or of their architectural role.
Finally, note that what is of particular interest in considering the
three lines of response is the way in which thought-transitions and
content-grasp will interact, as we shall see in due course.
We now begin our discussion of BLL-entry points by examining
Frege’s notion of self-evidence.
14Similar notions are discussed in Sellars (1954), Kremer (2001: 51-2) and Sullivan (2002: 64).
15See e.g. Wittgenstein (1914-16/1998: 100) and Tractatus (§5.13, §6.122), as well as Russell
(1903/1996: §45). See also Parsons (1965: 172).
16Frege (1924/25).
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2. Self-evidence
Of all the marks of the logical, self-evidence is the feature most of-
ten invoked by Frege to identify a BLL.17 Frege employed a number
of different terms to denote the concept that is rendered into English
as self-evident. The most important are selbstverständlich, einleucht-
end and unmittelbar klar, and they neatly characterise the three key
features that Fregean self-evidence possesses.
In the first instance, self-evidence is unmediated recognition of the
privileged epistemic status of BLL (BLL are given to us without exter-
nal mediation).18 Secondly, self-evidence makes BLL-content shine
through its linguistic garb (grasping the form of a BLL is grasping its
content).19 These two features jointly ensure that, in entertaining a
BLL, apprehension of its content and appreciation of its truth are acts
that are not even notionally separable. To grasp the content (via its
form and its form alone) is to see that it expresses amaximally general
truth of the appropriate kind.
Finally, self-evidence is epistemic self-standingness.20 BLL , that is,
stand on their own epistemic feet, as it were. They are self-justifying
in that they furnish their own justificatory grounds—BLL are true in
and of themselves.21 This is so because their truth does not depend
on that of other propositions (and it is precisely the unavailability of
proof for BLL that shows their epistemic independence).22
17It has often been remarked that Frege’s persistent doubts concerning Basic Law V were due to
its lack of self-evidence. See the afterword toGrundgesetze and Frege (1906b: 182). See Burge (1998:
348, fn. 21), Heck (2012: 32-4) and Schirn’s contribution to this volume for discussion. Much of
the credit for a revival of interest in the notion of self-evidence arguably goes to work done in Burge
(1998) and Jeshion (2001, 2004). For criticism see Weiner (2004) and Shapiro (2009).
18That’s the umittelbar bit. The common English translation as ‘immediate’ suggests unwanted
temporal connotations.
19This is the einleuchtend aspect. This aspect of self-evidence is essential to Frege’s idiosyn-
cratic conception of logical consequence. See Goldfarb (2010: §1) and Blanchette (2012: 142, 150)
for discussion. Self-evidence thus construed should not be confused with obviousness (compare
Quine (1970: 82) and Haack (1978: 235-6)). Obviousness is unearned and defeasible. Genuine
self-evidence on the other hand may, and typically does, require hard work (see the introduction
to GL).
20This is the selbstverständlich aspect. In the light of what I’ll say in the next section, a good (if
rather free) translation would be: ‘internal to the operations of the understanding’, or even: ‘due to
the powers of the understanding alone’.
21See Frege (1976: 62) where selbstverständlich and von selbst wahr are used interchangeably.
22GL (§2) tells us that one of the aims of proof is to bring out the order of dependence among
truths. In the limit, unprovability is thus proof of independence.
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The first two features belong to what is natural to call subjective
self-evidence (or thinker-relative self-evidence). By contrast, the third
feature seems best characterised as objective (or thinker-neutral) self-
evidence.23 Objective self-evidence is, again, an architectural feature
of the Sätze an sich, which the subjective uptake of that featuremerely
reflects. And one can earn one’s right to treat a given BLL as sub-
jectively self-evident only after having established its objective self-
standingness.24
Clearly enough, on the conception sketched in this section there is
no proper thought-transition to BLL involved. All the work is done
by the act of content-grasp, an act which is also, and eo ipso, an act of
truth-recognition.25
Ahighly legitimate complaint at this stagewill be that self-evidence,
thus construed, is really little more than a convenient label for a phe-
nomenon (the epistemology of BLL) that still resists full characteri-
sation. Beyond indulging in suggestive talk of rational insight,26 that
is, we haven’t really done much to sustain the idea that content-grasp
of this kind is rationally sanctioned, we haven’t really said what kind
of special act of intellection the notion of self-evidence is supposed
to capture. And, rather embarrassingly for the Fregean, unless we
can properly flesh out the notion of objective self-evidence, all that
we have on hand is subjective self-evidence, and with it, the loom-
23For this distinction see Burge (1998) and Jeshion (2001). See also Audi (1999: 214).
24In §5 we’ll examine one way of doing that. Note that for Frege subjective self-evidence is
defeasible. It is however still a notch-up from obviousness, which is a merely psychological notion,
whereas subjective self-evidence, although agent-relative, is not (the self-evidence involved is with
respect to purely logical concepts, and thus untainted by specific psychological processes).
25An exception, then, to Frege’s (1918-19: 355-56) insistence that content-grasp and acknowl-
edgement of truth be kept separate.
26Jeshion (2001: 956) speaks of “rational recognition of truth”, Burge (1992: 299-302) of BLL
being apprehended “purely through reason”. Field (2000: 363, fn. 6) thinks that talk of this kind
amounts to an “obscurantist redescription”. It’s hard to disagree. There are two recent attempts to
flesh out the notion of self-evidence as rational insight in terms of a logic faculty thesis. Frege might
have been sympathetic to some aspects of these proposals. See e.g. Frege (1906b: 181) where he
explicitly speaks of “logical capabilities” (logische Fähigkeiten) enabling us to grasp extensions. See
also (1924/25: 269; 1984: 235; GL: §§2, 90.) The two (significantly different) proposals are Evnine
(2001) and Hanna (2006). Whatever their independent merits, these proposals are incompatible
with a fully Fregean epistemology of BLL. For Frege, the posited features of the logic faculty must
be highly formal and make no reference to empirical findings—they should build up to a theory of
pure competence, with no infiltration from performance considerations at all (see e.g. Frege (1897b:
145-9)). Both proposals fail on this ground alone.
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ing spectre of psychologism.27 More specifically, the trouble with a
psychologist gloss of the hold that BLL exert on our thinking is that
it leaves the normative aspects of logic largely unexplained. On the
story as told so far, BLL appear to force themselves on us in a manner
that leaves us powerless to articulate the precise nature of that hold.
And one will of course want to ask: what has this got to do with logic?
The questions we need to face to allay this worry are: i) on what
rational basis can we recognise the privileged epistemic status of BLL
qua self-evident truths, and ii) in virtue of which objective properties
do BLL enjoy that status.
Let’s now examine an account that tries to answer both questions
by cashing out the notion of self-evidence in terms of understanding.
3. Sense-based Understanding
It wasn’t until a little throwaway remark in his last published work,
‘Compound Thoughts’, that Frege finally gave a substantive, if fleet-
ing, gloss to his notion of self-evidence.28 His suggestion there was
that the (objective) self-evidence of BLL manifests itself through the
transparency of compositionally determined sense. It is a familiar
Fregean thesis thatwe grasp the sense of thewhole by compositionally
computing the sense of its constituent parts.29 Equally familiar is the
idea that sense is, in general, the truth-conditional contributionmade
by an expression under embedment. In the case of BLL, then, the
computation of their sense from its constituent senses brings forth
the judgement that the truth condition thereby determined is neces-
sarily satisfied. And that this is so is immediately evident to anyone
who properly and fully grasps that sense. In other (very Fregean)
words, full understanding of sense is equivalent to taking the step to
the judgement regarding truth value, and indeed to the acknowledge-
ment that BLL name the True in all conceivable cases.30
27Tractatus §6.1271 conveys the young Wittgenstein’s disappointment that a thinker “as exact
as Frege” should have rested his epistemology of BLL on an apparently psychological notion. The
complaint is, I think, unwarranted (see fn. 24), but it needs work to show why it is so.
28Frege (1923a: 405). See also the earlier (1914a: 247) where we even find a proto-version of the
meaning-variance argument made familiar by Quine (1970: 81).
29Frege (1980: 79; 1914a: 225).
30See e.g. GG (I, §§12, 18). A sense-based explanation of self-evidence would obviously have
a further theoretical advantage: it would illuminate the central theoretical role played by the
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In terms of our previous discussion, the picture that now emerges
is one whereby we do countenance a transition to BLL, namely, that
effected by the sense-computation carried out by competent thinkers.
Moreover, the previously generic appeal to an underspecified rational
faculty that supposedly powers the mechanisms at play in the phe-
nomenology of self-evidence has now been replaced by a (relatively)
precise notion, namely, that of sense.31 And with the sense-based
view at hand we are also in a position to give reasons for our epis-
temic attitude towards BLL: it is our beliefs about constituent senses
and theirmode of combination that rationally sustain our belief about
the complex sense (that it is a truth of the appropriate kind).
So, by appealing to sense we can now give a neat account
of BLL-entry points as themselves rationally grounded, with the
added advantage that anti-psychologist anxieties are now altogether
side-stepped (on the Fregean account, senses are objective, non-
psychological entities).
A further benefit is that under this proposal the universality the-
sis too is (by and large) preserved. This is so because with the no-
tion of sense on board we have gained a different notion of proof,
namely, what is nowadays called ameaning-theoretic proof, and what
we should call, within a Fregean framework, a sense-theoretic proof.32
We can then say that BLL-justification is logic-involving but non-
circular. Here’s how.
First, let’s note that while any system-relative proof-theoretic
demonstration of the necessary truth of BLL would be epistemically
circular (whether or not viciously so), a sense-theoretic proof that
showed how the compositionally determined sense necessarily de-
notes the True would not be circular. On the contrary, epistemically
speaking it would be highly informative, since it would disclose (and
deploy) essential conceptual commitments incurred by any compe-
tent concept-mongering creature which are not immediately appar-
sense/reference distinction in Frege’s later work (see Simons (1992) for discussion). Indeed, we
could well say that while reference is essential to logic (Frege 1892/1895: 133), sense is essential to
its epistemology.
31Actually, what does the job is sense-grasp, a notion less precise than that of sense but still more
precise than the notion of rational insight.
32For some examples ofmeaning-theoretic proofs, see e.g. Davies (1981) and Lepore and Ludwig
(2007). Note that a sense-theoretic proof would not state contingent facts about a specific language
but rather non-contingent, language-independent facts about the composition of specific thoughts.
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ent from the (unembedded) grasp of the concepts involved.33 It is
only through their combination, that is, that BLL-constituent senses
generate justifying reasons. Of course a sense-theoretic proof would
still employ BLL-derived rules (e.g. modus ponens, conjunction in-
troduction, and existential generalisation) but those rules would not
be doing the fundamental explanatory work in the proof. Bottom-
up sense-determination (from the constituents to the whole, that is)
would. The universality thesis would thus be neatly preserved, or so
I’d argue, since logic is still involved in the BLL-proof by guiding and
policing its proper execution. It does so without circularity worries,
however, for the proof is sense-driven, and logic is taking, as it were,
a back seat.
This all sounds very promising indeed, nicely meeting all our con-
straints and providing a very Fregean answer to our problem.
Unfortunately, it seems to me that we have however created a new
problem. A sense-based notion of self-evidence gives rise to a ra-
tionally constrained transition to BLL (the sense-computation could
demonstrably go wrong), and that’s a very welcome result. But we
have also retained a more traditional form of immediacy, this time
at the level of sense-grasp—there is no mediation, inferential or oth-
erwise, between sense-grasp and truth-evaluation. And in my view
that’s where trouble arises.
To anticipate, the problem is two-fold, affecting the claim (which
needs to be in place for the account to work) that both the con-
stituent and the complex BLL-senses are fully transparent to reason-
ers and, secondly, the claim that the acknoweldgement of truth is
co-occurring with the act of full sense-grasp. More precisely, the
problems are that i) BLL-senses cannot bear the cognitive and proof-
theoretical weight required of them; and that ii) even if they could
bear it, the posited immediacy (the fact that to understand a given
BLL is to unconditionally grasp its validity) makes it impossible even
to entertain doubt as to validity in general (the process of reflective
self-scrutiny with respect to BLL has now become an incoherent no-
tion, that is).34
33This is perhaps the way in which Brandom (1994, 2008) and Lance and Kremer (1994, 1996)
can be seen as proper elaborations of the Fregean project.
34Frege (1923a: 405) seems to miss this point, where he suggests that negating a BLL does not
give rise to nonsense as long as one does not assert the negated proposition—the sense-based proposal
he makes in the next paragraph obliterates any distinction between thought-grasp and thought-
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Let me take these problems in turn. Regarding i), note that the
sense-based proposal treats BLL as content-analytic (true-in-virtue-
of-content). But it is unclear a) whether we have an appropriately
firm grasp of the constituent senses involved (for instance, of the no-
tion of value-range in Basic Law V);35 b) whether there is a definite
answer to the question of how (and if) we can legitimately pack into
the sense of a connective exactly the right amount of content that is re-
quired to fix the class of validities;36 and finally c) whether the sense-
theoretic proof would escape familiar undecidability issues (the class
of theorems supposedly contained within the content of the BLL is
not decidable and is hence unsurveyable).37
Thefirst round of difficulties, then, is that a sense-theoretic account
would be presupposing that we grasp the sense of the fundamental
notions of logic and arithmetic with a clarity that those notions do
not, as a matter of fact, afford. Note that this is as true of contem-
porary mathematicians as it was of Frege’s. For instance, it doesn’t
seem as if there is (or will ever be) a clear answer as to the question
of whether or not non-well-founded sets are sets properly so called,
nor is it clear whether e.g. in adjudicating between competing large
cardinal axioms we are being guided by the content of the concept of
set or simply determining it afresh. But if we are (radically) unclear as
to the constituent senses of BLL, it is obscure how we could possibly
derive from them a clear grasp of their complex sense.
And in any case, even if we did grasp the constituents clearly and
assertion in the case of BLL-thoughts. On the view he sketches, it would be irrational to grasp a
BLL-thought and not assert it.
35We also lack firm criteria, by Frege’s (1914a: 210) own admission, to establish when two senses
are the same (see e.g. Benacerraf (1981: 46), Dummett (1991b: 35) and Blanchette (2012: ch. 4) for
discussion). If so, it is unclear how we can sensibly speak of the complex sense as being “built up”
out of its constituents in the absence of a proof that the meaning function for the whole returns the
same value as the compositional function of its parts.
36As witnessed by contemporary debates on logical inferentialism over whether we ought to
include as part of themeaning of a connective just a (possibly proper) subset of the operational rules
or the sub-structural rules as well. Similar problems arise with respect to e.g. negation in debates
around dialetheism. See e.g. Priest et al. (2004: 4), Priest (2006: 122) and the Slater (2007)/Priest
(2007) exchange.
37See Gödel (1944: 138-40) and Benacerraf (1981: 65). Wemight bite the bullet (as Gödel (1951:
320-21) does) and accept that content-analytic truth might be undecidable. Given Frege’s cluster
theory of the logical, though, that option is not available (e.g. surveyability would be lost). The
further, familiar andmore general objection that the reduction would be circular is due to Poincaré.
See e.g. Parsons (1965: 167-171) for discussion.
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distinctly, we would still face the undecidability worries regarding the
proof-theoretical status of the derivation recalled above. It follows
that sense cannot be the sole vehicle of grasp of validity (it cannot
bear the required epistemic weight all by itself).
A further obstacle bars the way and this time the problem is that
the sense-theoretic proposal would be doing too much.38 If to fully
sense-grasp a BLL is eo ipso to unconditionally recognise its validity,
it follows that even a temporary suspension of validity-recognition
would immediately entail that the content in question is no longer
being grasped, that in withdrawing acknowledgement of its necessary
truth-value we no longer understand what the BLL actually says.
The trouble here is that in assessing the putative validity of a given
BLL (a task that seems rationally required to properly verify the good
standing of one’s BLL-belief) a gap is required for the assessment to
take place coherently. We need a temporary suspension of forced
acceptance of validity, a suspension that must however leave under-
standing intact—or else we couldn’t even know what we are testing
for validity, for as soon as doubt is raised one is no longer thinking of
the same law.39
By removing this gap, BLL-immediacy has wiped out the possibility
of metatheoretical reflection, and more generally of reflective norma-
tive ascent.40
How could a Fregean respond? The most promising reply is to in-
voke incomplete understanding, that is, incomplete grasp of the sense
involved—the hesitant (or deviant) thinker is seeing the sense “as if
through a mist”.41
But now new difficulties arise. For a start, it seems prima facie un-
promising to say that perfectly competent logicians who challenge
established logical laws do not understand the senses of the expres-
sions involved.42 They deny validity precisely because they under-
38The obstacle has been much discussed in a different context, namely, the Boghossian
(2003)/Williamson (2003) controversy. See my (2012: §6) for discussion.
39There are moves available here, such as appealing to a distinction between concept-possession
andone’s conception of that concept (see e.g.Higginbotham (1998: 150). Other cognate distinctions
are in Peacocke (1992: 29), Burge (1993: 460) and Horwich (2010: 242). None of these moves,
however, are compatible with Frege’s austere conception of the sense of logical notions.
40I modify a term from Owens (2000: 12). See also Korsgaard (1996: 92).
41Frege (1914a: 209-10, 215-22).
42Peacocke’s (1987: 163) bites the bullet here, claiming that unless one “appreciates” that p and
¬p are incompatible, one doesn’t understand negation
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stand what the BLL states.
Moreover, appeal to incomplete sense-grasp poses a dilemma for
the Fregean, for it either generates another regress or it forces a radi-
cal revision of the notion of sense. The revised notion, however, will
no longer be suitable to explain BLL-grasp. Here’s the dilemma. Un-
certainty about sense can either be uncertainty about its content or
about the way it is presented to us.
Suppose we go for the first horn. By definition, Fregean sense is
nothing over and above being a reference-determining algorithm.43
But then if we are confused about the content of a particular sense,
we must be missing out on some crucial reference-determining ele-
ment, something that is ex hypothesi essential to the sense being the
sense it is. On this horn then we have to sacrifice the defining condi-
tion of the notion of sense, since fuzzy grasp of a given sense could not
leave intact its reference-determining properties. A fortiori, it could
not carry out its task of providing BLL-justification.
If we move to the other horn, we find that things are just as un-
comfortable there. On that horn, the proposal is that in cases of in-
complete understanding what we are unclear about is not the content
of the sense but the way it is given to us. The assumption is now that
senses too comewithmodes of being given attached to them. Andwe
are thus off on a regress of modes of being given, one that we seem
unable to block in any non-arbitrary way.44
If these difficulties are as hard as I’ve made them out to be, it seems
as if a sense-based gloss on the notion of self-evidence cannot explain
how BLL are given to us without incurring unacceptable theoretical
costs.
It is now time to turn to the third line of response to our question, a
line that posits a constitutive role for logic with respect to judgement
and thought.
4.The Constitutivity of Logic
Earlier on, I rehearsed the complaint that it is unclear how a merely
impressionistic conception of self-evidence could account for the
43More cautiously: a reference-seeking algorithm. See e.g. Frege (1892/1895: 136; 1892: 174).
44See Bell (1987), Dummett (1986, 1989, 1990a,b), Beaney (1996: 219-20), Kremer (2010: 286-
89) and Burge (2012: 574-75).
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normativity of logic; a little later I objected to themore precise, sense-
based proposal because it left no gap between grasp of and critical
stance to BLL. In this section, I go over a proposal that is prima facie
spectacularly vulnerable to both complaints. This sounds rather un-
promising, but the proposal is one that Frege considered, and more
than once too. It is also a proposal that gets very close indeed to the
crux of the matter. We’d better give it a fair hearing then.
Our third proposal is that BLL are justified because they are consti-
tutive of thought: to think, the suggestion goes, is to reason in accor-
dance with BLL.
There are remarks that strongly support attributing a view of this
sort to Frege:
Wehave only to try denying any [BLL], and complete confusion
ensues. Even to think at all seems no longer possible. […] The
truths of arithmetic govern […] all that is thinkable.
The task we assign logic is […] that of saying what holds with
the utmost generality for all thinking.
[BLL] are themost general laws, prescribing how to thinkwher-
ever there is thinking at all. 45
The last claim seems particularly clear in taking thinking, properly
so called, to come into existence only when BLL are obeyed. It thus
seems as if BLL are not really laws at all. Rather, they are the con-
ditions for the possibility of thinking (no BLL, no thinking)—and if
that seems too strong, one can weaken the claim and say that BLL
are constitutive of genuinely rational, i.e. truth-oriented discourse.46
Either way, BLL set the standards that determine when our move-
ments between thoughts count as movements done for a reason, in-
deed movements done in the light not just of a reason, but of Reason
itself.47
45GL (§14); GG (xv), my emphases. MacFarlane (2002: 35) and Taschek (2008: 384ff.) read
Frege as committed to a constitutive view of BLL. Greimann (2014: 277-78) disagrees.
46As suggested in Greimann (2014: 278). Taschek (2008: 384) proposes that the constitutivity
claim is with respect to being a thinker (a thinker is someone who acknowledges the normative hold
of BLL). For his part, Frege (1879/1891: 4) is quite clear that BLL are not those “in accordance with
which we actually draw inferences”, or else, he adds, “we could never draw a wrong inference”. The
sense of thinking involved in those passages where Frege toys with a constitutive accounts, then, is
best read as a highly idealised one.
47See e.g. the end of §26 inGL. At least since Harman (1986) objections have been raised against
any straightforward identification between logic and rationality (or against treating logical entail-
ment as a trigger for demands of rationality). For a recent discussion see Broome (2013). I lack the
16 | Walter B. Pedriali
In the preface to Grundgesetze, however, Frege appears to back-
track, once again because of anti-psychologist worries:
Stepping outside logic, one can say: our nature and external cir-
cumstances force us to judge, andwhenwe judge we cannot dis-
card this law—of identity, for example—but have to acknowl-
edge it if we do not want to lead our thinking into confusion and
in the end abandon judgement altogether. I neither want to dis-
pute nor to endorse this opinion, but merely note that what we
have here is not a logical conclusion.48
Note that here Frege reminds himself (and us) of the point made in
his (1879/1891: 3) that logic has got to give out when it comes to as-
sessing the role of BLL. The constitutive arguments he’d previously
sketched are not ones that, Frege thinks, logic could endorse, or in-
deed have any use for. Why not? Well, largely, or so it seems, be-
cause talk of constitutivity could at best establish that we find modes
of reasoning supposedly constituted by different BLL utterly incoher-
ent, indeed beyond imagining. But this seems to disclose only facts
about our psychological make-up rather than provide a genuine ex-
planation of the fact that the normative hold of BLLmust extend, and
be seen to extend, to creatures with different psychological underpin-
nings. If so, the conclusions that one could establish via constitutiv-
ity arguments are powerless to provide absolute grounding for BLL.
At most, they’d provide perspectival grounds, grounds that would be
binding only for beings such as ourselves. The boulder-like unmov-
ability of BLL, then, would be diluted to a relative unmovability, one
to be explained solely in terms of the limits of what is conceivable to
us.
It thus seems as if when logic gave out it called out to epistemology
for help but it was psychology that instead answered the call. In the
remainder of this section, I want to sketch an account in terms of
constitutivity that might quell Frege’s anxieties. The way out, I think,
is to say that BLL are constitutive of something, namely, judgement,
that is wholly independent of our cognitive make-up or of contingent
aspects of our situatedness, or indeed of any situatedness.
That BLL are constitutive of judgement (taking judgement to be
space for a fuller discussion of these important issues, but I think Frege’s account can avoid those
objections, in that Fregean reasoning is everywhere reasoning from proved propositions.
48GG (xvii), my emphasis. See Ricketts (1986: 68), Conant (1991) and Shieh (2002: 101-03) for
discussion.
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an objective, non-psychological notion) is something Frege clearly
seems to have held. Consider the following claims:
To recognize something as true is to make a judgement.
Like ethics, logic can also be called a normative science. How
must I think in order to reach the goal, truth? We expect logic
to give an answer to this question.
Logic is concerned with the laws of truth, […] not with the
question of how men think, but with the question of how they
must think if they are not to miss the truth.
[BLL] set the standards for our thinking if it wants to attain the
truth.49
One might think that the last two remarks support attributing to
Frege a view of logic as purely instrumental reason (logic specifies
the means of achieving one’s alethic ends but is unable to give cate-
gorical reasons for the pursuit of those ends). But with the first re-
mark in mind, it seems clear to me that Frege did think that BLL are
constitutive of judgement. Judgement is truth-recognition, and only
BLL-observance can give rise to that. So, while thinking is possible
without judgement (1897a: 139)—that is, without aiming at truth and
hence without regard for BLL—judgement itself would not be possi-
ble at allwithout adherence to BLL, because to judge is to aim at truth
and only BLL can give guidance in that endeavour. Indeed, a few lines
below the tentative passage in the Grundgesetze preface cited above,
Frege abandons any hesitation and confidently claims that:
Whoever has once acknowledged a lawof being true has thereby
also acknowledged a law that prescribes what ought to be
judged, wherever, whenever and bywhomsoever the judgement
may be made.
The activity of judging, that is, can (and must) be explained with
no reference whatsoever to the idiosyncrasies of the judger. With
the BLL at hand, that is, we can define judgement in absolute, non-
thinker-relative terms.
It is however true that Frege (1919: 273) seems to qualify that un-
usually confident statement:
49Frege (1879/1891: 7, 1897a: 139; 1897a: 128; 1897a: 149;GG: xvi). Still on the same page from
the preface to Grundgesetze Frege equates the laws of being true with the laws of “what ought to be
thought”, i.e. the laws of how to judge.
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Both grasping a thought and judging are acts of a knowing sub-
ject and belong to psychology. Both acts, however, involve
something that does not belong to psychology, namely, the
thought.
I think Frege was again being overcareful here,50 but I also think that
one can take him at his word and restate the constitutivity thesis with
respect to objects of thought (with respect to thought as thought-
content, that is).51
So on this new reading of the thesis, it is not (just) that without
BLL in place there could be no rational thinking, or no judging at
all. Rather, without them there could be no thoughts, no order of
truths, no content at all. Why? Because the individuation condi-
tions for thoughts are given in terms of truth-determination (note:
of how a thought determines its truth condition, not just of what
truth-condition it determines) and BLL definewhat it is to determine
truth in a particular way. Individual BLL determine particular ways
of truth-determination (both for the base and for the compositionally
derived complex expressions) while BLL taken as a corporate body
unfold “the content of the word ‘true’ ”.52
Accordingly, I propose that the appropriate reading of the consti-
tutivity thesis is to be given in terms of content-constitutivity rather
than agent-constitutivity.53 This is the only way, it seems to me, to
respect both the anti-psychologism constraint and the universality
thesis (logic is constitutive of all that is thinkable, that is, of thought-
content itself).
On the agency-constitutive reading, any case of disagreement over
the status of a particular BLL is a case where as soon as we give up the
law we cease being reasoners altogether. We thus have the paradox
that in performing an act (the denial of a BLL), we thereby give up on
50Frege (1879/1891: 5-6) gives a more reasonable take on the matter. All that is required is that
one’s account not include “a relation to the judging subject”, as GG (xvi) puts it.
51Clearly, any version of the thesis must be taken to apply to BLL considered as a whole and not
individually, for while e.g. Identity is plausibly constitutive in a general way, Basic Law V can at best
be claimed to be constitutive only with respect to mathematical thought/thinking.
52Frege (1879/1891: 3). I lack the space to deal with another crucial aspect of the relationship
between BLL and judgement, namely, the question of Frege’s conception of the essence of logic and
of the role of assertion in revealing that essence. See Frege (1879/1891: 3; 1915: 252). See Taschek
(2008) and Greimann (2014) for discussion.
53The latter reading is much more common, see e.g. Burge (1992: 315). See Linnebo (2003) for
criticism.
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agency (we somehow succeed in performing an act which immedi-
ately consigns us to insanity).54
If we instead opt for a content-constitutive thesis, we can thenmore
plausibly say that in cases of hesitancy (or outright denial) what is lost
is not agency but content.55 The claim now is that in entertaining the
thought that a given BLL is invalid we are suffering from an illusion
of understanding. We are not really thinking a determinate thought
at all.56 It merely seems as if we do.
Suppose we grant that content-constitutivity does a better job of
explaining BLL-denial. Even with this result in the bag, however, we
will still be unable to address the two problems that I anticipated at
the start of the section.
First, constitutivity claims, however flavoured, fail to answer the
normativity question. If BLL are the conditions for the possibility
of thought-content or of agenthood (of being a thinker, of being a
judger), their justification (and the demands they pose) will only be
hypothetical, not categorical. BLL will tell us to abide by them if one
wants to be an agent, if one wants to be capable of having thoughts,
if one cares for truth. But what is gained by these claims? They only
make sense to someone who already is an agent, capable of enter-
taining thoughts, caring for truth (and doing so for the right reasons
too). They do not explain why one should accept BLL, they would
not move someone who is wilfully disregarding them because wholly
disengaged from the project of agenthood.57
Secondly, and relatedly, a constitutive account of BLL, like a sense-
based account, obliterates the required distance between content-
grasp and content-evaluation. If BLL cannot coherently be doubted,
if there is no activity that counts as doubting them, if doubting a BLL
is tantamount to not having a thought at all, then it’s again unclear
54For claims along these lines see e.g. Korsgaard (2008: 61) and Davidson (1985: 195-6).
55Under the loss of agency view, Frege himself, in his pre-1902 state, should count as a logical
alien, a non-reasoner that somewhat miraculously retained enough critical faculties to understand
Russell’s letter and take remedial action.
56The content-constitutivity reading is supported by some textual evidence. According to Frege
(1976: 127), asserting the negation of a false thought makes the content that we’d putatively be
entertaining “strictly speaking incomprehensible”. In the case of logically false thoughts, assertion
would make them widersinning, counter-sensical, almost “lacking in content” (1923b: 393). Incon-
sistentist theorists ofmeaning embrace this result. See Eklund (2002), Patterson (2007b,a), Azzouni
(2006, 2007), Scharp (2007), Armour-Garb (2007).
57See e.g. Lavin (2004), Enoch (2006, 2011), Ferrero (2012) and Shah (2010).
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that we can make any sense of the notion of reflective scrutiny over
our practices. Constitutivity theses simply rule out hesitation with
respect to BLL, for in hesitating we exit the space of Reason (either
by losing agency or by losing content, and hence precipitating into
nonsense)—indeed, hesitation has itself become a nonsense concept.
And so we have reached, yet again, an impasse. To escape it, we
need to regain the space needed for the normative evaluation of BLL.
But how? Let us now explore a proposal that does carve out such a
space by uniting the various strands considered so far.
5. Frege’s Pragmatic Foundationalism
So far, we have considered epistemologies of BLL firmly in keeping
with the all-out foundationalist mould of classic rationalism. Within
this tradition, the guiding principle is that there is a class of basic
truths and that we apprehend them, by whatever means, singly. The
grasp is atomic, as far as each law is concerned, and wholly grounded
in its content—the different accounts we considered differed only
with respect to the mode and character of that act of grasping.
But there is arguably another streak in Frege. There is, that is, a
pragmatic twist on rationalism brought about by Frege’s insistence,
reiterated at the end of the preface to Grundgesetze, that we evaluate
truths by testing them for fruitfulness.58
Tomake full sense of this proposal, it is helpful to heed a distinction
between BLL-grasp and BLL-evaluation. The accounts so far exam-
ined had for the most part attempted to do away with this distinction
so as to satisfy the immediacy desideratum (in grasping BLL-content
we were taken to be reaching an evaluative conclusion as well). If we
now reinstate the distinction, we can then view the pragmatic com-
ponent as being concerned, at least in the first instance, with the ver-
ification of the logicality of the principles adopted, rather than with
their grasp. So, there is a grasp-phase, where self-evidence (however
defined) plays a major individuating role. But then there is also an
evaluative phase in which the chosen BLL are put to the test. We do
proofs, we see how far they take us, we modify the class of BLL to suit
our theoretical purposes (simplicity, surveyability, completeness and
so forth) and then, and only then, we come to the conclusion that the
58See also e.g. Frege (1880/1881: 33): “fruitfulness is the touchstone (Prüfstein) of concepts”.
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initial impression of subjective self-evidence is now sustained by the
confirmation of their objective self-evidence. After exhaustive “road-
tests”, that is, we can finally be confident that everything is in order
with the chosen system, and this “experimental” realisation gives us
retrospective justification for our choice of BLL.59
There are several passages in Frege’s work that do support the attri-
bution of this sort of “hands-on” view that I propose to dub pragmatic
foundationalism.60 Perhaps the most striking of all comes from Car-
nap’s lecture notes, where Frege is said to have remarked that “too
much weight is put on showing that a claim is evident: not enough
on [the] web of inferences that supports it”.61 The fruitfulness (and
basicness) of our BLL is thus something that is verified experimen-
tally, and a posteriori.62
This approach tidily integrates several aspects of Frege’s views re-
garding BLL while also providing a firm and highly articulate an-
swer to our main question. BLL are self-evident (in the sense of self-
standing) but that they are so is something that can only be disclosed
to reasoners when they attain the sort of full understanding that can
only be attained once one is fully conversant with a system of proof.63
Self-evidence, then is both the starting and the end point of jus-
tification. Moreover, the way we get from one end to the other is a
highly illuminating (and rationally mandated) journey. Accordingly,
on this suggestion when logic gives out it is not epistemology per se
that takes over but rather methodological pragmatism.
59See GG (vii), Frege (1897b: 235). The retrospective justification envisaged here obtains in
virtue of highly general features of rational deductive practice. By verifying that our system does
exactly what it was designed to do, we gain insight into the privileged status of the laws that we had
treated as epistemically foundational. On this view, theories are reasons for believing in the axioms.
See also the intrisinc/extrinsic justification distinction in Maddy (2011: ch. V, §4).
60See the discussion in Burge (1998), Jeshion (2001: 969), Ruffino (2002) and Reck (2007).
61Reck and Awodey (2004: 138).
62Note the striking similarities to Whitehead and Russell (1910/1997: v). The experimental
nature of the verification in no way impinges on the a priori status of the terminal justification. The
evaluative-phase is required because of our cognitive limitations, but the justification-makers that
we eventually uncover remain firmly a priori.
63Gabriel’s (1996) proposal that for Frege BLL-justification is some sort ofmeta-comment on the
chain of reasons revealed by the Begriffsschrift proofs is a form of pragmatic foundationalism too
(p. c.), and perhaps similarly for Weiner’s (2001: 175) claim that it is understanding of the concept-
script that gives us epistemic access to the truth of BLL and Sullivan’s (2004: 738) suggestion that
BLL-justification flows from “reflective appreciation of the adequacy of a completed structure of
justification” (my emphasis).
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Yet another problem now arises, however. On reflection, it seems
as if under this proposal logic hasn’t given out after all. For in test-
ing for fruitfulness (and other familiar theoretical virtues) surely we
must employ some principles of logic. For instance, there must be
some ranking principle that will state which system (i.e. which choice
of BLL) would be preferable and on what grounds. Consider for ex-
ample one of Frege’s many experimentally-flavoured remarks: “com-
putation must quickly bring to light any flaw in the concept forma-
tions”.64 Suppose we find a flaw in concept-formation: which part of
the theory gets modified and on what basis? Do we revise the rules of
inference, the axioms, the sub-structural rules, or some fundamental
concept underlying the entire construction (as was the case follow-
ing the post-1902 upheaval)? And what logical principles do we use
to do our housekeeping? The worries here should be familiar from
the Quinian onslaught on Carnap, as well as from powerful criticism
of Quine’s own Two Dogmas.65
In short, any judgement concerningBLL-fruitfulnesswill have to be
reached via inference, it will have to employ, that is, properly logical
means. And so pragmatic foundationalism, whilst tidily uniting all
the marks of the logical in a unitary explanation of BLL-justification,
has taken us back into the jaws of what Sheffer (1926: 228) called the
logocentric predicament: “in order to give an account of logic, wemust
presuppose and employ logic”. Circularity threats have once again
come to the fore, blocking, or so it seems, our attempts at clarifying
how logical laws are authoritatively given to us.66
And there is a further worry too, raised in Shapiro (2009: 190).
Once we allow holistic elements into our epistemology, what is left of
foundationalism? In short, is pragmatic foundationalism a form of
foundationalism at all?
In the final section, I try to address both worries.
64Frege (1880/1881: 35).
65See especially Wright (1986). See also Sainsbury (2002).
66Haack (1976) put the threat most forcefully. See e.g. Dummett (1973), (1991b: ch. 8), Boghos-
sian (2001: §3), Hanna (2006: ch. 3.4), Field (2005: 85) and Heck (2012: 29) for discussion.
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6. A Dynamic Foundationalism?
It looks as if all our attempts have somehow ended up in failure.
Should we finally concede defeat and agree with those who read
Frege as having argued for the “unintelligibility of a wholesale jus-
tification of logic”?67 Not quite yet. In the previous section, we
regained the much-needed reflective space between BLL-grasp and
BLL-evaluation. The price was justificatory circularity and the ap-
parent dilution of Frege’s foundationalism. I nowwant to see whether
these two issues could be resolved. Towards that aim, I will outline
a BLL-epistemology that, while undoubtedly unusual, is one that I
think remains largely in keeping with Frege’s views.
First, and for by-now familiar reasons, I want to keep open the gap
between BLL-grasp and BLL-evaluation. I think one can remain rel-
atively neutral as to which strategy to adopt re BLL-grasp. Sense-
grasp is my preferred option, but it seems to me that constitutivity
approaches could also be made to work.68 As far as BLL-evaluation
is concerned, the methodologies outlined in the previous section will
also do, with the provisos shortly to be discussed.
Secondly, I need to parry the accusation that as soon as the gap
for BLL-evaluation is opened up and pragmatic considerations are al-
lowed in, one has thereby sacrificed the purity of one’s foundational-
ism. I think the accusation can be blocked by going externalist about
content. I also think there are good independent reasons to attribute
such a view to Frege.69 With that view on board, BLL-evaluation
is only possible after one has unfolded that part of the content ex-
pressed by BLL which is not immediately transparent to a thinker.
The content-externalist claim is that BLL are partly about the system,
and hence their content cannot be available to reflection prior to the
67(George 2000: 14). See also e.g. Goldfarb (1979), Dreben and van Heijenoort (1986: 44-5),
Floyd (1998), Hanna (2006: ch. 3).
68What would need showing to make constitutivity accounts work is how the purely epistemic
project for which BLL are constitutive is inescapable because without it there would be no notion of
evidence available, and hence no way for any form of subjecthood to come about (e.g. even Enoch’s
(2006) shmagent needs to have a notion of evidence in her conceptual repertoire in order to express
disdain for the agency project, i.e. in order to be able to ignore or mishandle evidence). I discuss
this option in my ‘Evidentialism and Belief without Reasons’ (ms.).
69Again, while I lack the space to do so here I defend the attribution in my ‘Frege on content:
hybrid theorist or externalist?’ (ms.). My view is closer to Wiggins (1994) than to Burge (2005b:
57-8).
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construction of a system of proof. In this way, the pragmatic evalu-
ation is not taken to be just an add-on element which is there to en-
able beings of limited cognitive resources to verify the good standing
of the BLL. It is rather the only way in which that part of the content
is made available to any thinker. In fact, I would want to argue (al-
though I won’t have the space to do so here) for a stronger point: it is
the only way in which that part of the content comes into being.
The third thing that I need to do is to sketch the defence of a dy-
namic view of BLL-content that would provide one natural way to
sustain the content-externalist claim and thus retain the foundation-
alist slant to Frege’s conception of logic. The content-externalism at
stake here is not just the claim that BLL-content is partly about the
system, but that it is also partly about reasoning acts. Call it, if you
wish, act-externalism.70
6.1.The Dual Character of BLL
To set the stage, let’s recall that for Frege the foremost task in our re-
flective enquiry is “to isolate the logical”.71 One of the lessons that I
think we can now draw from the preceding pages is that there is how-
ever no royal road to the logical. We lack a single method that takes
us to all BLL in the same way. The cluster theory sketched in §1.1
gave a list of the marks of the logical that all BLL must satisfy. Each
such mark will be satisfied in different ways, and to different degrees
of explanatory priority by each BLL.72 There is therefore no single an-
swer to the question of how BLL are given to us, for the sui generis
justification of BLL is achieved through non-uniform methods. Each
BLL will require a different sort of justification reflecting the specific
range of inferential movements that it licenses (e.g. justifying the law
of Identity will mobilise different resources than justifying the con-
70The view is foreshadowed in e.g. Burge (2005b: 54) (”the connection between individuals’
expressions (or thought events) and the contents that are thought depend, at least partly, on the
individual’s activities and capacities.”) and in Gödel’s (1961/?: 383) remark that the “clarification of
meaning [of the axioms] consists in focusing more sharply on the concepts concerned by directing
our attention […] onto our own acts in the use of these concepts, onto our powers in carrying out
our acts”. In both cases, it seems as if the role of our reasoning acts is taken to play an enabling role.
The view I sketch is instead intended to include those acts as part of the content of BLL.
71(Frege 1879/1891: 5).
72Indeed, as Burge (1998: §II) rightly notes, the explanations given in support of each BLL in
Grundgesetze differ in method.
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ditional or Basic Law V).
Secondly, in thinking about the logical, we have so far been taking
it to be somewhat static stuff. Granted, BLL are propositions. And yet
they are also rules for the conduct of reasoning, for the direction of
our intelligence; they tell us how to move between thoughts in ways
that ensure proper regard for truth-preservation. I think we must
do justice to the operational side of BLL. In fact, I maintain it is this
dual character of BLL that holds the key to (part of) an answer to our
question.73 BLL, that is, are both propositions and rules, they are both
declarative and operational in character, they are static truths but also
procedural instructions as to what to do with thoughts. This is after
all, only to be expected, for in the realm of reference there are only
truth-values and other logical objects; in turn, in the realm of sense
there are only thoughts, the static order of truths, a realm of propo-
sitions. But logic, properly speaking, is about neither realm, since it
is, rather, about movements among those thoughts; logic is, that is,
about reasoning acts. Sure, those movements are constrained by the
order of truths, but they only come into existence once BLL qua rules
are exemplified by reasoners, reasoners that are to be characterised in
complete abstraction from their psychological trappings.74 Accord-
ingly, the three Fregean realms of objectively given entities need com-
plementation by a fourth realm, the one determined by logic, a realm
of rational movements between thoughts, a realm of reasoning acts.
So, we can now say that BLL are propositionally basic, in that no
other proposition can justify them. However, when taken qua rules,
BLL are epistemically improvable (and thus justifiable). Rules, as Sel-
lars (1950: 155) proposed, are lived, not described.75 And we justify
them first by their exemplification in acts of reasoning, and secondly
by demonstrating that, so exemplified, they generate the appropriate
class of consequences (as suggested by the pragmatic foundational-
ism model). Accordingly, BLL-qua-rules can be justified by some-
73MacFarlane (2002: 36) speaks of a “dual aspect” of BLL, but he thinks their operational side is
implied by them rather than being part of their content broadly construed.
74This is, I think, a fully Fregean take on the matter, given that, as Frege (1882: 97) stressed, the
purpose of the Begriffsschrift was “not to formally represent an abstract logic” but rather to “express
a content” as precisely as possible. And as BG §13 makes clear, the task of logic includes not just
expressing a static content, but also making manifest “the relations of judgements to one another”
(my emphasis).
75Sellars, though, opted for a version of the elucidatory strategy later defended by Weiner (see
fn. 6 on p. 3). A similar view concerning epistemic norms is in Pollock and Cruz (1999: §3.4.3).
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thing epistemically stronger, namely, the entire order of truths and
the structuring relations therein as disclosed by the exemplification
of BLL-qua-rules. This, I think, should lessen one’s worries re the lo-
gocentric predicament, since the operational character of BLL is not
justified by logic but rather by the acts it licenses, by something that
logic determines but does not wholly constitute—reasoners too are
needed.
Now, how does this help with Shapiro’s objection that the envi-
sioned pragmatically derived justification is incompatible with foun-
dationalism?
Well, here’s a quick argument that I think should block the ob-
jection. For Frege (1906c: 338), logic has content; it is about “its
own concepts and relations” such as “negation, identity, subsump-
tion, subordination of concepts”. Moreover, BLL contain, “as if in a
seed”, all of their consequences (those consequences are part of their
content).76 But that content won’t become available to a thinker un-
til the construction of the system of logic is completed (a system that
is, in effect, a structure of assertions supported by proofs).77 It fol-
lows, or so I’d argue, that the content of BLL is opaque to thinkers
until the completion of the system. So, it’s not that knowledge of the
axioms depends (cannot be prior to) knowledge of the theorems.78 It
is, rather, that properly speaking knowledge of the axioms (i.e. of the
BLL) is knowledge of the theorems. Note that the knowledge remains
grounded in the axioms and that their full content is not available
even to ideal reasoners until the system has been constructed (and
76Frege (1885b: 104; 1893/1998: II §147; 1914b: 221). For the Kantian origin of this metaphor,
see Kant (1781/1998: A834/B862), where the architectonic of pure reason is characterised as the art
of (constructing) systems.
77Frege (1914a: 221, 242). Throughout the sequel, I’m taking the role of the system to go be-
yond the mere provision of enabling conditions. By contrast, e.g. Burge (1998: 337) takes it that
understanding the inferential connections displayed by a system is a necessary condition for un-
derstanding the content of the BLL. The content of the latter, however, is not taken to include that
of their consequences. Clearly, I’m taking Frege’s ”as if in a seed” metaphor more strictly instead.
78Shapiro (2009: 193). BG (§13) draws a distinction between knowing the BLL and knowing,
in addition, how those laws are interconnected. Crucially, Frege adds that it is only through this
second, extended kind of knowledge that one can identify the class of BLL. This might sound like
holism, but ifmy content-externalist claims go through, Frege’s positionwould still count as founda-
tionalist. What Frege calls knowledge of BLL is what I call knowledge of BLL-qua propositions. The
extended kind of knowledge is knowledge of BLL-qua-rules, which in turn makes manifest those
elements of BLL-content that, because they are partly about the system and partly about reasoning
acts, cannot be fully captured in propositional terms.
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indeed given the inexhaustibility of the mathematical universe, prop-
erly speaking the content is never fully articulated).79 Moreover, it is
only through the implementation of a system that the operational side
of the BLL-content is disclosed (it is the system that makes it possible
for genuinely rational thought-movements to occur).
If all this is on the right tracks, we can now answer Shapiro’s wor-
ries. First, the methodological pragmatism is not an epistemological
add-on that weakens the foundationalism. On the contrary. Because
it contributes to the unfolding of the BLL-content, the pragmatically
derived input is in fact strengthening the foundationalism. The holis-
tic elements mobilised at the BLL-evaluation stage add nothing to
the propositional content of BLL, that is, and they are not meant to
“wholly replace” one’s prior understanding of BLL.80 They don’t pro-
vide, by themselves, justification either, for what they do is merely
enable grasp of the full content of BLL, a content that in addition to
including that of the theorems is also partly about the system and
partly about reasoning acts. The foundationalism is therefore intact
because unlike in the Quinian picture, it’s not that the theorems pro-
vide support for the axioms (qua propositions). On the contrary: the
epistemological priority still belongs to the axioms of whose content
the theorems are but proper parts. Under holism, all that there is to
the choice of axioms is that they fulfil the role reserved for them by
the architectural argument. By contrast, on the view canvassed in this
section axioms occupy that role in virtue of their content. And if so,
the foundationalism hasn’t collapsed into holism after all.81
79This is consistent with Frege’s realism, because the way the content is determined is wholly
independent of the reasoner. It remains true, that is, that “we grasp thoughts but we do not create
them” (Frege 1906b: 198).
80Shapiro (2009: 192).
81I think that the passages in Frege (1879/1891: 3; 1897a: 126; 1915: 252) regarding the essence
of logic provide further support for my attribution of the doctrine of act-externalism to Frege. We
are first told that the essence of logic is given by the word ‘true’, that BLL unfold the content of
that word. But then we are told that the sense of that word is semantically inert, that it makes no
truth-conditional contribution under embedment. And the way this reveals the essence of logic,
Frege adds, is precisely due to its failure to semantically express anything. It is, Frege concludes, the
assertoric force that inherits the task which the word ‘true’ could not carry out. And assertoric force
is something that belongs to acts of judgement, acts of reasoning. Only through those acts, then,
can the essence of logic—what the BLL are about—be disclosed, precisely as per my theory. Note
that under act-externalism, it is sense-grasp, in my extended sense, that secures BLL-grasp.
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6.2. Content-recarving and Justification
I’ve outlined an epistemology of BLL whereas each law contributes
distinct elements that are jointly constitutive of rationality. I’ve tried
to allay circularity worries by appealing to the dual character of BLL
as both propositions and rules. I’ve also tried to defend a variety of
pragmatic foundationalism that keeps justification essentially inter-
nal to the content of the BLL (themethodological pragmatismmerely
unfolds that content). Furthermore, the reflective scrutiny gap has
been held in place by preserving the BLL-grasp/BLL-evaluation dis-
tinction. In effect, however, on this account BLL-evaluation is also
BLL-grasp, to the extent that the full content of BLL only becomes
available on completion of the evaluation procedure. But it is per-
fectly all right to speak of grasp of BLL ahead of their evaluation
since what we initially grasp is their core propositional content to-
gether with their procedural content, while their full content is fully
grasped, to the extent that it can be so grasped, only after the system
is constructed.
We thus have the sketch of an answer to the question of how BLL
are given to us. Recall though that the Urproblem facing us was how
logical objects are given to us. In closing, I want to very briefly talk
about the basic law that Frege entrusted—unwisely, as we all know—
with the task of solving that problem. What shouldwe say about Basic
Law V (BLV), then? Here’s my suggestion.
As we saw, Frege’s official position is that logic has the right to
remain silent regarding transitions in thought that do not originate
from other truths. I think that there are however some transitions
local to a single thought, transitions that do not take us from one
thought to another, but rather keep us within the same thought, and
show it under a different description, as it were. I think we should
say that according to Frege it is these privileged infra-contentual con-
ceptual transformations that can generate logical objects.82 And
their legitimacy cannot be supported by proof precisely because these
reasoning acts are infra-contentual—there is no movement between
82I say ‘can’ because of the Bad Company Objection against abstractionist accounts of this kind.
Some transformations (see e.g. Hale and Wright 2001: ch. 10) will create bogus objects because
they result out of bad infra-contentual moves. Here I’m also assuming that the two sides of BLV
express the same thought, a highly contentious claim indeed. See Ebert (forthcoming) for a recent
discussion.
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thoughts, but only between different analyses of a single thought. Ac-
cordingly, Frege’s suggestion is that we take the legitimacy of these
single-thought transitions as a BLL:
[I]f one function (of first-level with one argument) and a
second function are so constituted that both always have the
same value for the same argument, then one may say instead:
the value-range of the first function is the same as the value-
range of the second. We then recognise something in common
to both functions and this we call the value-range both of the
first function and of the second function. That we have the right
so to acknowledge what is common, and that, accordingly, we
can convert the generality of an equality into an equality (iden-
tity), must be regarded as a basic law of logic.83
That, then, is the genuine architectural requirement. For any logical
knowledge to be in place, there must be a range of conceptual trans-
formations that although not provable from other truths are neverthe-
less sanctioned by logic. The crucial point therefore is that it is logic
itself that must force the acknowledgement of the required Umwand-
lung.84 But whence does the entitlement to take the transformation
as a BLL flow? How does logic force that transformation on us?
Here, I think, the constitutivity component has got to set in: when-
ever and wherever any reasoner makes that transition, initiating the
transformation between the conceptual decomposition on one side
of (a properly sanitised version of) the law into the decomposition
we find on the other side, then BLV will sanction the generation of
logical objects, objects that, though independent of reasoners, exist
only as generated through those transitions and must be recognised as
such by whoever understands the concepts involved. Note that it is
possible to understand the thought without making the transition (or
without being aware of its possibility). But if one is presented with the
transition, then proper understanding of the thought-content and of
its possible internal articulations will indeed force the recognition of
the logical legitimacy of the transition.
83GG (II §146). See also §9 in book I and Frege (1891: 142). Value-ranges are logical objects
because they arise purely from concept-recarving and BLV gives an argument for that conclusion.
84This is stated most clearly in Frege (1906b: 181-2) (but see also (1897b: 235; 1924/25)): it is
through our logical capacities that we get hold of extensions (objects associated with and generated
from concepts). And logic “compels us almost ineluctably” to implement the transformation. On
this proposal, BLL are immediate in the sense of “without inferentialmediation”, not immediate tout
court.
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And so any reasoner, regardless of her psychological make-up, will
be forced by logic to acknowledge the emergence of the logical ob-
jects thus disclosed.85 Crucially, the self-evidence with which these
transitions strike us is logical self-evidence. In reflecting on the con-
tent of e.g. the right hand side of BLV, we come to realise that if two
functions are such that their algorithms map arguments and values
in exactly the same way, then there is some object which is the com-
mon outcome of the application of the two procedures, namely, their
value-range. The reasoning, if correct, is entirely logic-based, because
content, for Frege, is a purely logical notion, and content-recarving is
content-internalmovement. The universality thesis is thus preserved,
and without intrusion from psychology.
Now, of course BLV is where Frege’s ill-fated logicist enterprise
came to a crushing halt in what Tait (1997: 246) has called “an act of
recklessness” (the foolish assumption that concepts and objects can
be paired one-to-one).86 In the end, the law failed both the test of
self-evidence and of pragmatic evaluation (due to its flawed assump-
tion that every algorithm determines a set-like extension, the law was
overgenerating, positing objects for cases where none could be found).
I would however say that Frege’s striking idea that conceptual re-
carving is a legitimate source of knowledge is left substantially un-
affected by the paradox. Some properly regimented version of Basic
Law V would vindicate that idea, and there is nothing that precludes
in principle the possibility of some such regimentation.87
Earlier on, I said there was no single answer to the question of how
BLL are given to us. At one level, however, we could say that there is.
BLL are fully given to us via the construction of a system and via the
reasoning acts that exemplify the thought-movements sanctioned by
85Again, see Frege (1906b: 181-2). The compellingness here is anything but primitive (in Pea-
cocke’s (1992) sense). It is in fact highly sophisticated.
86The (alleged) recklessness is due to Frege’s disregard of Cantor’s warnings. For a slightly less
brutal assessment, see Parsons (1976: 134-5). Ebert and Rossberg (2009) dismiss Tait’s accusation
altogether.
87Note that the object-generating direction of BLV is not paradox-inducing. Three more points:
i) as Frege himself noted (GG (II: 260)), the paradox goes deeper thanBLV; ii) as e.g. Heck (1996) has
shown, BLV is consistent in a predicative setting (and so it is not solely responsible for the paradox:
e.g. unwise comprehension principles share the blame (Linnebo 2004), and a Fregean solution may
well keep BLV-like principles and modify other moving parts in the account—e.g. restricting Rule
9 in §48, vol. I, see e.g. Antonelli and May (2005) for one implementation). Of course, difficulties
persist, see e.g. Sullivan and Potter (1997), Potter and Smiley (2002), Potter and Sullivan (2005),
Sullivan (2007). But also see Milne’s (2010) two novel ways of fixing BLV.
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BLL. It is BLL qua exemplified rules that power the transition to BLL
qua propositions. When logic gives out, then, it is not epistemology
on its own that takes up the slack. Rather, it is logic-driven reasoners
that step in to complete the task.88
88I am very grateful to the editors of this volume and to an anonymous referee for insightful
comments that helped improve this paper. An early version of this paper was presented at the
Early Analytic Group, Stirling, in October 2013. Thanks are due to the audience on that occasion,
in particular to Peter Milne, Michael Potter, Stephen Read and Peter Sullivan. Additional thanks
are owed to Dr. Gottfried Gabriel. Work on this paper was carried out during my Early Career
Leverhulme Fellowship at Stirling. I am very grateful to the Leverhulme Trust and Stirling for their
support in those three years.
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